It is no longer news that the Nigerian Senate President, Senator (Dr.) Abubakar Bukola Saraki is in the news over an assets declaration transgressions: conducts prohibited and "punishable" by the Code of Conduct for Public Officers as contained in the 5th Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. The facts of the case/his charges are already in the public domain, hence, I would not border dwelling on them. It is not also news that the matter is before the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) and the charge for which the matter was brought before the Tribunal was preferred and signed by one M. Hassan of a Deputy Director at the Federal Ministry of Justice (MOJ).
Saraki had run to the Federal High Court (FHC) to obtain an experte order to bar the CCT from proceeding with his trial pending when the FHC must have determined whether, in the light of section 24 of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, it was proper for a prosecution can be initiated by the Ministry of Justice in the absence of a substantive Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF)
The twist now is that the Federal High Court rather gave an order summoning the Ministry of Justice, the Code of Conduct Bureau and others to appear before it on Monday, September 21, 2015 to show cause why the trial of Saraki at the Code of Conduct Tribunal should not be stopped; while on the other side, the CCT has issued a Bench Warrant on Saraki for refusing to appear before it to answer to the charges against him. The said Bench Warrant ordered the Inspector General of Police, IGP and other security agencies to arrest and bring Saraki before the Tribunal on the same Monday.
It is to these expositions that I am compelled to look at the law sorrrounding these intriguing circumstances and how this Saraki's saga may affect the government.
First, the law.
The Constitution of Nigeria as the grundnorm touches on many important aspect of our national life. To this effect, the framers of our Constitution observing that those who occupy public offices are in a position of trust, for which a high degree of integrity, probity and accountability are required; deemed it necessary to ensure that certain safeguards are put in place to guarantee the sustenance of this public trust. Among other standards set by the Code of Conduct, a public officer must declare his/her assets within three (3) months of coming into office; after every four years and at the end of his/her tenure. Failure to declare such assets or any false declaration of assets is a breach of the Code of Conduct and such officer is liable to forfeit such public office; not hold public office for a period not exceeding 10 years. These exactly fit into the circumstances of Saraki's case.
To further give effect to the provisions of the Code of Conduct as contained in the Constitution, the National Assembly enacted the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act (CCBT Act).
Now, some charges have been preferred against the Senate President alleging breach of the code of Conduct as per false declaration of assets when he was a former governor of Kwara State between 2003 to 2007. Instead of going to answer to the charges against him at the CCT, Saraki has approached the FHC to contended that the charges against him at CCT were preferred and filed in breach of the powers of the AGF as provided for under section 24 (2) of the CCBT Act; and that in the absence of an AGF, such charges cannot not be validly preferred.
For the purposes of clarity, it would be worthwhile to reproduce the provision of section 24 (2) CCBT Act as follows:
(2) Prosecutions for all offences referred to in this Act shall be instituted in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by Attorney-General of the Federation or such officer of the Federal Ministry of Justice as the Attorney-General of the Federation may authorise so to do.
The general constitutional prosecutorial powers of the AGF is provided under section 174 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria and such powers by section 174 (2) may be exercised by the Attorney-General in person or through an officer of his department.
By the authority of Ibrahim v the State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 650 the Attorney-General can expressly delegate his power of public prosecution.
However, with respect to powers of the Attorney-General to discontinue any criminal proceedings, as per section 174 (1) (c) of the Constitution, our various criminal procedure laws specifically provided for the manner in which it could be exercised. This is known as the powers of "nolle prosequi." Statutes like the defunct Criminal Procedure Act, CPA under section 73 (1) provided that such powers to discontinue criminal proceedings is to be exercised by the Attorney-General appearing in person or by a written authority to a law officer in his department. The Criminal Procedure Code has similar provision under section 253; hence in Attorney-General, Kaduna State v Hassan the Supreme Court specifically held that the powers of the Attorney-General to enter nolle prosequi is personal to him and cannot be exercised by any other person, not even the Solicitor General, unless such power has been delegated to such person by the Attorney-General; and that such power cannot be delegated unless there is an incumbent Attorney-General. Same was also the decision in State v Chukwurah (1964) NMLR 64; while the case of Obasi v State (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 567) 686 was specific on this point and went further to point out that the said power of the Attorney-General to enter nolle prosequi is not delegable by implication.
The new Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 towed the same part under it's section 107 (1).
Some lawyers have mistaken the case of Attorney-General of the Federation v All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP) & 2 Ors. (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 182 as being in conflict with those case which say that the power of nolle prosequi cannot be exercised in the absence an Attorney-General.
The ANPP's case deals the appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal which affirmed the decision of the High Court of FCT, Abuja declaring Prince Abubakar Audu fit to contest the governorship election in Kogi State in 2003. The appeal was filed when the Federal Executive Council have been dissolved, so there was no Ministers including the AGF who is the Minister of Justice. The Supreme Court dismissed an objection that the appeal was incompetent in the absence of an Attorney-General. The court held that the office of the Attorney-General is a "corporate sole" and exists in perpetuity regardless of whether there is a sitting Attorney-General or not.
The ANPP's case has nothing to do with the mode of exercise of power of the Attorney-General to enter nolle prosequi which is specifically provided by statute.
The point here is that where power is donated by statute or the mode of exercise of certain powers has been specifically provided by statute, the provisions of such statute must be adhered to, else the exercise of such powers would be declared ultra vires.
Section 24 (2) of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act is on point. It say such prosecution shall be instituted by the AGF or such officers in the Federal Ministry of Justice as the AGF may authorise so to do.
Who is the Attorney-General that has authorized M. Hassan to institute the Charge against Saraki at the CCT? None! Could such authorization be done in the absence of an Attorney-General? The answer is in the negative.
What is more? The provision of section 24 (2) of CCBT Act should not be likened to the general prosecutorial powers of the Attorney-General under sections 174 & 211 of the Nigerian Constitution, which are said to be delegable expressly and impliedly. This is because, aside the fact that section 24 (2) is specific on mode and whom to institute prosecution, the provision on the general prosecutorial powers of the Attorney-General under section 174 and 211 of the 1999 Constitution deal specifically which power as per instituting, taking over and discontinuing CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. Can the trial of Saraki at the CCT be said to be a criminal trial/proceeeings? NEVER!
The reason for this disagreement is that by paragraph 18 (3) of the Code of Conduct as contained in the 5th schedule to the 1999 Constitution and section 23 (3) of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act sanctions mentioned in (2) is without prejudice to the penalties that may be imposed by law where the conduct being tried also amounts to a criminal offence.
If trial at CCT is to be considered a CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, then the above provision would amount to double jeopardy.
Notwithstanding the use of the words "offence" and "punishment" in the Code of Conduct, it appears from the sanction imposeble by the CCT that these sanctions are rather disciplinary than punitive.
Talking about delegation of powers of the Attorney-General, I am not unmindful that the Law Officers Act under its section 4 empowers the Solicitor-General to act in place of Attorney-General in the absence or vaccum in the office of the Attorney-General. That means that the Law Officers Act has delegated all Attorney-General's powers to the Solicitor-General, in the absence of an Attorney-General albiet.
The Charges against Saraki were preferred and signed by M. Hassan, a Deputy Director at the Federal Ministry of Justice. It was not by the Solicitor-General. Can it now be argued that pursuant to the Law Officers Act, the Solicitor-General of the Federation has appointed/delegated M. Hassan to prefer and sign the Charge sheet? That will be unacceptable, as I will need no authority to contend that a delegated power cannot be re-delegated. The Latin maxim is: "delegatus non potest delegare."
With the situation as hopeless as it appears, our dear Senate President has approached the FHC to seek redress. The jurisdiction of the FHC Court in the circumstance of this case is donated by section 251 (1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, that is to say:
"Any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies."
In the case at hand, Saraki is seeking declaration and injunction as to the validity and the legality of the executive decision of the Federal MOJ and the administrative decision/action of the CCB (Both agencies of the Federal Government) to charge Saraki before the CCT, especially as regards the powers to prefer and sign a charge which appear to be an administrative and executive function of the Federal Attorney-General.
Recall that it was argued by M. Hassan, Deputy Director, Federal Ministry of Justice, while urging the CCT to issue a Bench Warrant against Saraki, that it was wrong for the FHC to have ordered that Saraki's trial at the CCT be stayed, pending when the FHC must have disposed the substantive suit. He based his argument on the proposition that the FHC and the CCT are of concurrent jurisdiction and as such, the FHC cannot make an order staying proceeding at the CCT. Which argument the CCT unwholesomely bought. This misconception by M. Hassan and judicial miscarriage by the CCT is invariably predicated on the provisions of paragraph 18(4) & (5) of the Code of Conduct and section 23(4) & (5) of the CCBT Act which have it that appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the CCT.
The true position of the law is that the FHC and the CCT do not have concurrent jurisdiction. The fact that appeal from both Courts lies to the Court of appeal does not make both courts of concurrent jurisdiction.
In Nigeria, we have two kinds of courts, the "superior" courts of records and the "inferior" courts. Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution is clear on courts that are superior courts of record. By section 6 (3), the Constitution made it so clear that the courts established under section 6 (5) (a) to (i) shall be the only superior courts of records in Nigeria. Section 6 (5) (c) went on to list the FHC as one of such seperior courts. But no mention was made of the CCT as a superior court, even though it's a creation of the Constitution. The implication of this is that the CCT as an inferior Court is subject to the powers of judicial review of the superior court, in this case, the FHC as encapsulated in section 6 (1) (2) & (6) (a) (b). Consequently, the FHC has powers to inquire and even issue declaration and injunction concerning the validity and the legality of the executive decision of the Federal MOJ and the administrative decision/action of the CCB (Both agencies of the Federal Government) to charge Saraki before the CCT, especially as regards the powers to prefer and sign a charge which appear to be an administrative and executive function of the Federal Attorney-General.
Yes, Saraki is under obligation to answer to the charges against him at CCT, it is still proper for him to challenge the powers to prefer and sign the charge against him in a forum he deems appropriate. Which in this case is the FHC. This cannot be termed "forum shopping." It is rather "forum convenient."
On the other hand, the MOJ and the CCB/CCT are also under obligation to appear before the FHC to show cause why the trial of Saraki at CCT should not be stopped.
Paradventure, as Saraki is still at the FHC and has appealed his order of arrest by the CCT, it turns out that the FHC rules that the the charges were invalidly preferred in the absence of an Attorney-General, that will mean that M. Hassan of MOJ would have to stay off the trial at CCT or appeal that decision. And if that is the case, the charges abate, until we get an Attorney-General, who may bring them all afresh. Saraki cannot remain at the CCT when the prosecutor has been disqualified by a superior court of records.
On the other hand, if M. Hassan gets a nod to proceed, Saraki would have to go and face the charges against him at CCT or he would have to appeal that decision. In both case, the appeal proceeds while the main charges is abandoned until the day the appeal is entirely disposed off, up till the Supreme Court. God knows when!
Even if the trial at CCT proceeds and Saraki is found guilty, that dude has the right of appeal to the court of appeal and supreme court, which may linger till this tenure elapses. And if he fails on appeal, by the time the tenure may have lapsed, he would simply retire; or the matter may wane off if the political essence of the trial has been overtaken by events.
On governance, the ultimate question is: what will stop a serious minded administration from appointing an Attorney-General about five month into its inception? This is nothing but sheer constitutional irresponsibility. The government should simply appoint an Attorney-Genearal and save us all these intrigues.
The situation become dicier when it is called in mind that same Saraki will be the one presiding over the Senate that would approve the appointment of Ministers whenever they are eventually made. Could the political insinuations be true that the Saraki's episode is aimed at delaying the appointments of Ministers? I am not troubled by that anyway. I am more concerned that this whole Saraki's trial would generate a great deal of friction between the Senate and the Executive.
Here is a government that has been on an endless "honeymoon" since its inception. And now the Senate President would be distracted by attending proceedings at the Code of Conduct Tribunal. He has the support of the majority of the Senators, and these Senators would likely be attending proceedings with him to show their able President solidarity. Will that not negatively affect activities at the National Assembly? A National Assembly whose output have not be commensurate to the funds so far expended on it since its inauguration about five months ago.
I also wonder why the ruling party has chosen to preoccupy itself with self-opposition. First it was exposition by Lagos State government about Fashola's spendings while in office. Now it is Saraki. Could the ruling party be suffering from opposition hangover? To be an Opposition Ruling Party is simply novel in politics and governance.
Be that as it may, if this is their idea of fighting corruption, nice then! But why only Saraki? Could he be the only past Governor/public officer that may have breached the Code of Conduct? Why is he being singled out? It appears we are in for another interesting episode of the Nigerian Senate Presidency Game of Throne.
But the ultimate question is, at whose detriment?
Saraki had run to the Federal High Court (FHC) to obtain an experte order to bar the CCT from proceeding with his trial pending when the FHC must have determined whether, in the light of section 24 of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, it was proper for a prosecution can be initiated by the Ministry of Justice in the absence of a substantive Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF)
The twist now is that the Federal High Court rather gave an order summoning the Ministry of Justice, the Code of Conduct Bureau and others to appear before it on Monday, September 21, 2015 to show cause why the trial of Saraki at the Code of Conduct Tribunal should not be stopped; while on the other side, the CCT has issued a Bench Warrant on Saraki for refusing to appear before it to answer to the charges against him. The said Bench Warrant ordered the Inspector General of Police, IGP and other security agencies to arrest and bring Saraki before the Tribunal on the same Monday.
It is to these expositions that I am compelled to look at the law sorrrounding these intriguing circumstances and how this Saraki's saga may affect the government.
First, the law.
The Constitution of Nigeria as the grundnorm touches on many important aspect of our national life. To this effect, the framers of our Constitution observing that those who occupy public offices are in a position of trust, for which a high degree of integrity, probity and accountability are required; deemed it necessary to ensure that certain safeguards are put in place to guarantee the sustenance of this public trust. Among other standards set by the Code of Conduct, a public officer must declare his/her assets within three (3) months of coming into office; after every four years and at the end of his/her tenure. Failure to declare such assets or any false declaration of assets is a breach of the Code of Conduct and such officer is liable to forfeit such public office; not hold public office for a period not exceeding 10 years. These exactly fit into the circumstances of Saraki's case.
To further give effect to the provisions of the Code of Conduct as contained in the Constitution, the National Assembly enacted the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act (CCBT Act).
Now, some charges have been preferred against the Senate President alleging breach of the code of Conduct as per false declaration of assets when he was a former governor of Kwara State between 2003 to 2007. Instead of going to answer to the charges against him at the CCT, Saraki has approached the FHC to contended that the charges against him at CCT were preferred and filed in breach of the powers of the AGF as provided for under section 24 (2) of the CCBT Act; and that in the absence of an AGF, such charges cannot not be validly preferred.
For the purposes of clarity, it would be worthwhile to reproduce the provision of section 24 (2) CCBT Act as follows:
(2) Prosecutions for all offences referred to in this Act shall be instituted in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by Attorney-General of the Federation or such officer of the Federal Ministry of Justice as the Attorney-General of the Federation may authorise so to do.
The general constitutional prosecutorial powers of the AGF is provided under section 174 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria and such powers by section 174 (2) may be exercised by the Attorney-General in person or through an officer of his department.
By the authority of Ibrahim v the State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 650 the Attorney-General can expressly delegate his power of public prosecution.
However, with respect to powers of the Attorney-General to discontinue any criminal proceedings, as per section 174 (1) (c) of the Constitution, our various criminal procedure laws specifically provided for the manner in which it could be exercised. This is known as the powers of "nolle prosequi." Statutes like the defunct Criminal Procedure Act, CPA under section 73 (1) provided that such powers to discontinue criminal proceedings is to be exercised by the Attorney-General appearing in person or by a written authority to a law officer in his department. The Criminal Procedure Code has similar provision under section 253; hence in Attorney-General, Kaduna State v Hassan the Supreme Court specifically held that the powers of the Attorney-General to enter nolle prosequi is personal to him and cannot be exercised by any other person, not even the Solicitor General, unless such power has been delegated to such person by the Attorney-General; and that such power cannot be delegated unless there is an incumbent Attorney-General. Same was also the decision in State v Chukwurah (1964) NMLR 64; while the case of Obasi v State (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 567) 686 was specific on this point and went further to point out that the said power of the Attorney-General to enter nolle prosequi is not delegable by implication.
The new Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 towed the same part under it's section 107 (1).
Some lawyers have mistaken the case of Attorney-General of the Federation v All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP) & 2 Ors. (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 182 as being in conflict with those case which say that the power of nolle prosequi cannot be exercised in the absence an Attorney-General.
The ANPP's case deals the appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal which affirmed the decision of the High Court of FCT, Abuja declaring Prince Abubakar Audu fit to contest the governorship election in Kogi State in 2003. The appeal was filed when the Federal Executive Council have been dissolved, so there was no Ministers including the AGF who is the Minister of Justice. The Supreme Court dismissed an objection that the appeal was incompetent in the absence of an Attorney-General. The court held that the office of the Attorney-General is a "corporate sole" and exists in perpetuity regardless of whether there is a sitting Attorney-General or not.
The ANPP's case has nothing to do with the mode of exercise of power of the Attorney-General to enter nolle prosequi which is specifically provided by statute.
The point here is that where power is donated by statute or the mode of exercise of certain powers has been specifically provided by statute, the provisions of such statute must be adhered to, else the exercise of such powers would be declared ultra vires.
Section 24 (2) of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act is on point. It say such prosecution shall be instituted by the AGF or such officers in the Federal Ministry of Justice as the AGF may authorise so to do.
Who is the Attorney-General that has authorized M. Hassan to institute the Charge against Saraki at the CCT? None! Could such authorization be done in the absence of an Attorney-General? The answer is in the negative.
What is more? The provision of section 24 (2) of CCBT Act should not be likened to the general prosecutorial powers of the Attorney-General under sections 174 & 211 of the Nigerian Constitution, which are said to be delegable expressly and impliedly. This is because, aside the fact that section 24 (2) is specific on mode and whom to institute prosecution, the provision on the general prosecutorial powers of the Attorney-General under section 174 and 211 of the 1999 Constitution deal specifically which power as per instituting, taking over and discontinuing CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. Can the trial of Saraki at the CCT be said to be a criminal trial/proceeeings? NEVER!
The reason for this disagreement is that by paragraph 18 (3) of the Code of Conduct as contained in the 5th schedule to the 1999 Constitution and section 23 (3) of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act sanctions mentioned in (2) is without prejudice to the penalties that may be imposed by law where the conduct being tried also amounts to a criminal offence.
If trial at CCT is to be considered a CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, then the above provision would amount to double jeopardy.
Notwithstanding the use of the words "offence" and "punishment" in the Code of Conduct, it appears from the sanction imposeble by the CCT that these sanctions are rather disciplinary than punitive.
Talking about delegation of powers of the Attorney-General, I am not unmindful that the Law Officers Act under its section 4 empowers the Solicitor-General to act in place of Attorney-General in the absence or vaccum in the office of the Attorney-General. That means that the Law Officers Act has delegated all Attorney-General's powers to the Solicitor-General, in the absence of an Attorney-General albiet.
The Charges against Saraki were preferred and signed by M. Hassan, a Deputy Director at the Federal Ministry of Justice. It was not by the Solicitor-General. Can it now be argued that pursuant to the Law Officers Act, the Solicitor-General of the Federation has appointed/delegated M. Hassan to prefer and sign the Charge sheet? That will be unacceptable, as I will need no authority to contend that a delegated power cannot be re-delegated. The Latin maxim is: "delegatus non potest delegare."
With the situation as hopeless as it appears, our dear Senate President has approached the FHC to seek redress. The jurisdiction of the FHC Court in the circumstance of this case is donated by section 251 (1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, that is to say:
"Any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies."
In the case at hand, Saraki is seeking declaration and injunction as to the validity and the legality of the executive decision of the Federal MOJ and the administrative decision/action of the CCB (Both agencies of the Federal Government) to charge Saraki before the CCT, especially as regards the powers to prefer and sign a charge which appear to be an administrative and executive function of the Federal Attorney-General.
Recall that it was argued by M. Hassan, Deputy Director, Federal Ministry of Justice, while urging the CCT to issue a Bench Warrant against Saraki, that it was wrong for the FHC to have ordered that Saraki's trial at the CCT be stayed, pending when the FHC must have disposed the substantive suit. He based his argument on the proposition that the FHC and the CCT are of concurrent jurisdiction and as such, the FHC cannot make an order staying proceeding at the CCT. Which argument the CCT unwholesomely bought. This misconception by M. Hassan and judicial miscarriage by the CCT is invariably predicated on the provisions of paragraph 18(4) & (5) of the Code of Conduct and section 23(4) & (5) of the CCBT Act which have it that appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the CCT.
The true position of the law is that the FHC and the CCT do not have concurrent jurisdiction. The fact that appeal from both Courts lies to the Court of appeal does not make both courts of concurrent jurisdiction.
In Nigeria, we have two kinds of courts, the "superior" courts of records and the "inferior" courts. Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution is clear on courts that are superior courts of record. By section 6 (3), the Constitution made it so clear that the courts established under section 6 (5) (a) to (i) shall be the only superior courts of records in Nigeria. Section 6 (5) (c) went on to list the FHC as one of such seperior courts. But no mention was made of the CCT as a superior court, even though it's a creation of the Constitution. The implication of this is that the CCT as an inferior Court is subject to the powers of judicial review of the superior court, in this case, the FHC as encapsulated in section 6 (1) (2) & (6) (a) (b). Consequently, the FHC has powers to inquire and even issue declaration and injunction concerning the validity and the legality of the executive decision of the Federal MOJ and the administrative decision/action of the CCB (Both agencies of the Federal Government) to charge Saraki before the CCT, especially as regards the powers to prefer and sign a charge which appear to be an administrative and executive function of the Federal Attorney-General.
Yes, Saraki is under obligation to answer to the charges against him at CCT, it is still proper for him to challenge the powers to prefer and sign the charge against him in a forum he deems appropriate. Which in this case is the FHC. This cannot be termed "forum shopping." It is rather "forum convenient."
On the other hand, the MOJ and the CCB/CCT are also under obligation to appear before the FHC to show cause why the trial of Saraki at CCT should not be stopped.
Paradventure, as Saraki is still at the FHC and has appealed his order of arrest by the CCT, it turns out that the FHC rules that the the charges were invalidly preferred in the absence of an Attorney-General, that will mean that M. Hassan of MOJ would have to stay off the trial at CCT or appeal that decision. And if that is the case, the charges abate, until we get an Attorney-General, who may bring them all afresh. Saraki cannot remain at the CCT when the prosecutor has been disqualified by a superior court of records.
On the other hand, if M. Hassan gets a nod to proceed, Saraki would have to go and face the charges against him at CCT or he would have to appeal that decision. In both case, the appeal proceeds while the main charges is abandoned until the day the appeal is entirely disposed off, up till the Supreme Court. God knows when!
Even if the trial at CCT proceeds and Saraki is found guilty, that dude has the right of appeal to the court of appeal and supreme court, which may linger till this tenure elapses. And if he fails on appeal, by the time the tenure may have lapsed, he would simply retire; or the matter may wane off if the political essence of the trial has been overtaken by events.
On governance, the ultimate question is: what will stop a serious minded administration from appointing an Attorney-General about five month into its inception? This is nothing but sheer constitutional irresponsibility. The government should simply appoint an Attorney-Genearal and save us all these intrigues.
The situation become dicier when it is called in mind that same Saraki will be the one presiding over the Senate that would approve the appointment of Ministers whenever they are eventually made. Could the political insinuations be true that the Saraki's episode is aimed at delaying the appointments of Ministers? I am not troubled by that anyway. I am more concerned that this whole Saraki's trial would generate a great deal of friction between the Senate and the Executive.
Here is a government that has been on an endless "honeymoon" since its inception. And now the Senate President would be distracted by attending proceedings at the Code of Conduct Tribunal. He has the support of the majority of the Senators, and these Senators would likely be attending proceedings with him to show their able President solidarity. Will that not negatively affect activities at the National Assembly? A National Assembly whose output have not be commensurate to the funds so far expended on it since its inauguration about five months ago.
I also wonder why the ruling party has chosen to preoccupy itself with self-opposition. First it was exposition by Lagos State government about Fashola's spendings while in office. Now it is Saraki. Could the ruling party be suffering from opposition hangover? To be an Opposition Ruling Party is simply novel in politics and governance.
Be that as it may, if this is their idea of fighting corruption, nice then! But why only Saraki? Could he be the only past Governor/public officer that may have breached the Code of Conduct? Why is he being singled out? It appears we are in for another interesting episode of the Nigerian Senate Presidency Game of Throne.
But the ultimate question is, at whose detriment?
